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LIKE A FISH NEEDS A BICYCLE: PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS
THERESA A .GABALDON*
INTRODUCTION
There is, perhaps, only one thing left to say on the relationship of
publicly held corporations and their shareholders, and it has some-
thing to do with fish and bicycles'' "Ownership" of the corporation,
already debunked by the law and economics movement of the 1980s2
and criticized by the progressive law scholars of the 1990s,' simply is a
guiding myth used to give order to large-scale enterprises based on a
perceived analogy to closely held businesses. Every function per-
formed by the shareholders of a publicly held corporation could be
performed by some other actor in the corporate scenario; every role
played by the public sharehOlder could be reallocated and the share-
holder himself or herself would never be missed, except as a symbol of
something that perhaps might have been, but never was.
This does not mean that the corporate wheel is on the verge of
being reinvented. No sane commentator would believe that the pub-
lic will could be mustered to revise every corporate charter or to
restructure the capital markets, even though actual changes in opera-
tion might be slight. Still, it is useful to recognize the mythic power of
current corporate structuring, anticipating manipulation of its param-
eters to serve specific purposes in particular contexts as opportunities
arise.
* Professor of Law and Carville Dickinson Benson Research Professor of Law, George
Washington University Law School. B.S., University of Arizona; J.D., Harvard Law School.
The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Bryan Sillaman,
Rob Reiser, and Jason Wyrick; the inspiration of William T. Palmer; and, as always, the
efforts and insights of Robert L. Palmer.
1. The expression "A woman needs a man like a fish needs a bicycle" is often attrib-
uted to Gloria Steinem. The Phrase Finder, Phrases, Sayings and Idioms, http://www.
phrases.org.uk/meanings/414150.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). According to Steinem,
however, Irina Dunn, a distinguished Australian educator, journalist, and politician,
coined the phrase in 1970. Id.
2. See generally Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi, Introduction to I LAw AND Eco-
NOMics, at ix-xii (Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi eds., 1997) (explaining briefly the
origins of the law and economics movement); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Corporate Law, 50 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1477, 1477-78 (1993) (discussing
the decline of the stockholder ownership model and the rise of the contract paradigm).
3. E.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical FrameworkforEnJbrcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REv. 579, 595-603 (1992) [hereinafter Theoretical Framework].
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This Article is intended to contribute to the longstanding debate
over shareholder primacy-the argument about whether corporate di-
rectors should or should not be expected primarily to strive to en-
hance the profitability of public corporations for the benefit of their
shareholders. The first step in its analysis is a brief review of the share-
holder primacy debate. The second is the provision of a bit of back-
ground on feminist and critical race theory. The third is an
application of feminist and critical race theory to the question of
shareholder primacy. It is this application that demonstrates that pub-
lic corporations do not need shareholders, that privileging the inter-
ests of shareholders vis-A-vis the interests of other parties interacting
with corporations therefore is unnecessary, and that the shareholder
primacy doctrine prevents examination of the interests of those not
adequately represented in prior corporate law colloquy. It examines
the difficulty of opening these secrets to public scrutiny and concludes
with specific proposals dealing with the positioning of feminists and
critical race theorists in future policy debates.
I. BACKGROUND: THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY DEBATE
An astounding-no, make that astounding-amount has been
written on the subject of corporate purpose,4 sometimes alternatively
cast as the question of whose interests corporate directors primarily
should serve.5 Over decades of interest in the subject, approaches to
the issue have fallen out more-or-less along the lines described below.
A. The Contractarians: The Givens and the Goals of Shareholder Primacy
The law and economics school of legal analysis describes the cor-
poration as a "nexus of contracts" among capital providers, managers,
employees, and others, all of whom conduct themselves in a manner
that is rationally self-interested.6 Adherents to this school, sometimes
known as "contractarians," characterize the "best" or "most efficient"
corporate law as providing the "best" or "most efficient" set of default
contract rules.7 These are the rules that contractarians have deter-
4. See, e.g., Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a Corporation: An Intro-
duction, 24J. CORP. L. 807 (1999).
5. Id. at 809-12.
6. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976); see also FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF CORPORATE LAw 1-39
(1991) (discussing the corporate contract); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Con-
tract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 767, 770-74 (1989) (characterizing the
corporation as a nexus of contracts).
7. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 36.
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mined the parties would negotiate for themselves most frequently
(but which still may be negotiated around).'
The rules generally endorsed by contractarians reflect the as-
sumption that managers are agents for shareholders.9 Limiting the
duties of the board of directors to serving shareholder interests is
thought to be the single best method of limiting managerial opportu-
nism and shirking, owing to the relative efficiency of monitoring by a
single class of beneficiaries.1 ° The board therefore is regarded as re-
sponsible for maximizing the residual value of the firm remaining af-
ter nonshareholder claimants are satisfied.11 This easily translates to
the twin assertions that the goal of the corporation is to make money
for its shareholders' 2 and that the interests of shareholders are to be
preferred over those of others with interests in the firm.13 The result-
ing template for corporate law thus is known as the "shareholder pri-
macy" model.14
B. The Progressives
During the 1990s, a group of corporate law scholars possessing
communitarian values launched an attack on the neoclassical eco-
nomic analysis just described. 5 The attack focused on the relation-
ship between management and shareholders and quickly rejected the
notion of shareholder primacy.16 Corporate progressives generally
endorse an expansion of the goals of the corporation and the duties
of management to include responsibility to other constituents, 17 fre-
quently arguing for the recognition of enforceable fiduciary duties
8. Id. at 17.
9. Id. at 91.
10. Id. at 35-39.
11. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primaty, 75 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1189, 1193 (2002).
12. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 35-39.
13. Id. at 90-93.
14. David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production
Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1001, 1001, 1005-09 (2000).
15. David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strate-
gies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw 1, 16-22 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter
respectively Communitarianism and PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW].
16. SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 306-07 (arguing for shareholder primacy);
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sept. 13, 1970 (same). But see Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1713, 1714 (1993) (contending that the number of people that view share-
holder primacy as the default norm is decreasing); Communitarianism, supra note 15, at 9-13
(arguing against shareholder primacy).
17. See, e.g., Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed
Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 587
(1997); Communitarianism, supra note 15, at 11.
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running from directors to groups such as creditors and employees. 8
As an alternative or supplemental approach, progressives also have
proposed methods of increasing the board's discretion to recognize
nonshareholder interests. 9 These methods include extending the
terms for which members of the board are elected and adopting statu-
tory safe harbors for consideration of the interests of nonshareholder
constituencies.2 °
C. The Team Production Model
The "team production" approach21 speaks the language of neo-
classical economics, but makes somewhat different starting assump-
tions.22 The consequence is a set of conclusions that often resonate
23with corporate progressives. Team production scholars characterize
the board of directors as an independent "hierarch" mediating among
all those with "team-specific" inputs to the corporation.24 In this view,
the proper function of the board is to employ the inputs of financiers,
workers, communities, and others in order to maximize the value of
the firm.25 Not incidentally, this requires the board to allocate corpo-
rate profits fairly among all inputting groups.26 Shareholders are per-
mitted, as a matter of convenience, to elect directors and to bring
derivative actions on behalf of the corporation. 27
As part of their analysis, team production scholars have relied
upon an "options" theory28 introduced by economists in 1973.29 Ac-
18. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1165 (1990); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1189 (1991).
19. See Theoretical Framework, supra note 3, at 581-82 (questioning the stockholder-own-
ership paradigm).
20. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 104-19 (2001) [hereinafter
CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY].
21. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. Rev. 247 (1999) [hereinafter Team Production]. Note, however, that the adherents of this
model specifically disavow identification as progressives. Id. at 253-54.
22. Id. at 249-50.
23. Id. at 253.
24. Id. at 249-50.
25. Id. at 250-51.
26. Id. at 251 & n.7.
27. Id. at 313-15.
28. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating
Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 411-14 (2001) [hereinafter Director Account-
ability] (explaining how options theory undermines the principal-agent model); Stout,
supra note 11, at 1191-92 (discussing the options theory in the context of ownership of the
corporation).
29. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
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cording to this theory, once a firm has issued debt, debtholders and
holders of equity both share contingent control and bear residual
risk.3" Thus, it might be said either that the debtholders "own" the
firm and have sold a call option to the shareholders or that the share-
holders "own" the firm and have bought a put option from the
debtholders.3 1 "Ownership" rights thus are no more and no less than
whatever rights are possessed by those denominated as "owners."
D. Responses to Corporate Progressives and the Team Production Model
The late years of the last century and the early years of this one
have seen efforts to respond to progressive 2 and team production
analyses.33 Some portion of these responses have comprised a reitera-
tion of some of law and economics' basic assumptions in the context
of an examination of the precise claims of the newer schools, generat-
ing statements along the lines of the following: "By vesting sharehold-
ers with an exclusive right to a corporation's residual, then, the
principal-agent model facilitates adoption of the sort of mechanisms
that can reduce the risk of opportunism and thus minimize the trans-
action costs associated with inducing team-specific investment. 34
This is, of course, a reassertion of the norm of shareholder primacy in
a slightly louder voice for those who did not get it the first time
around, indicating that the debate is alive, well, and unlikely to be
resolved as a matter of logical persuasion.
The extended exchanges among contractarians, progressives, and
team production scholars have showcased, however, at least two real-
life points worthy of mention. One is that state legislatures indeed
have, in large numbers, adopted safe-harbor statutes (known as "con-
stituency statutes") permitting, but not requiring, boards of directors
to consider nonshareholder interests without fear of personal liabil-
ity.3 5 The other is that there is an impressive array of extralegal forces
nonetheless prompting corporate boards to observe a shareholder pri-
30. Id. at 648-49.
31. Id. at 649.
32. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997) (reviewing
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 15); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real About Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility: A Reply to Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 645 (2002)
(responding to progressive views by analyzing their practical impact).
33. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assess-
ment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002); Millon, supra note 14.
34. Meese, supra note 33, at 1671.
35. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Po-
tential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2253 (1990); Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 647-48.
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macy norm. 6 These include competitive market pressures to keep
labor costs down lest product price rise, fear of relative disadvantage
in capital-raising, perceived susceptibility to hostile takeover, and psy-
chological acculturation. 7 In retrospect, it seems fairly clear that the
drive for profit maximization by public corporations has in no way
declined subsequent to the popular adoption of constituency statutes,
which suggests that the extralegal forces described have been suffi-
ciently powerful to counterbalance the latitude state legislatures os-
tensibly intended to confer.38
II. BACKGROUND: FEMINISM AND CRITICAL RACE THEORY
A. Feminism and Corporate Law
The multiple concerns of feminists 9 share a common overlay of
focus on the position of women in a patriarchal society and a common
goal of expunging the perceived inequalities of that position.4' The
applications of feminist analysis to corporate law have been somewhat
scarce, 41 although feminist descriptions of the effects of capitalism
and neoclassical economic ordering have existed for years.42
In recognizing the relevance of feminist analysis to corporate law,
the critical first step is to acknowledge the various guises of inequality.
It easily is discerned lurking behind overfly discriminatory laws, few of
which exist in the field of corporate law.43 Inequality also inheres,
however, in subjugation to regimes developed on the basis of princi-
36. Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 651-53.
37. Id. at 651.
38. See Ryan J. York, Comment, Visages of Janus: The Heavy Burden of Other Constituency
Anti-Takeover Statutes on Shareholders and the Efficient Market for Corporate Control 38 WILIAM-
ETrE L. REv. 187, 189-90 (2002) (noting the abundance of other constituency statutes).
39. See SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 244 (1986) (arguing that
feminism is and should be analytically unstable); NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS, at ix (Elaine
Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron eds., 1981) (describing a split within feminism); Christine
A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. RaV. 751, 753
n. 11 (1989) (book review) (discussing how pluralizing feminism may cause it to fail at its
common aims).
40. LindaJ. Lacey, Introducing FeministJurisprudence: An Analysis of Oklahoma's Seduction
Statute, 25 TULSA LJ. 775, 780 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence: An
Agenda for Research, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 521, 523 (1987). See generally Deborah L. Rhode,
Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990).
41. Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Lim-
ited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1413-14 (1992) [hereinafter
Lemonade Stand].
42. .E.g., CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM (Zillah R. Eisen-
stein ed., 1979); MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED: A NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS
(1988).
43. See, e.g., Alan Carlos Blanco, Comment, Fetal Protection Programs Under Title VII-
Rebutting the Procreation Presumption, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 755 (1985) (demonstrating how
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pies not endorsed by those excluded from the formative process. 44
Examining this possibility in the context of given fields of law, includ-
ing corporate law, is a significant feminist undertaking.45 As part of
this undertaking, the experience of women is examined, the values of
women are explored, and existing legal and social structures are as-
sessed in terms of their arguable congruence with that experience and
those values. This type of analysis does not presuppose that the exper-
iences and values of all or most women are significantly different from
those of all or most men, but the very real possibility that a difference
exists dictates the approach.
One indisputable theoretical difficulty is faced by any feminist
analysis attempting to articulate the values manifest in the experience
of women.46 Focus on the values of women seems to assume that
those values will be self-evidently common and appears to suggest that
any given woman's experience is an appropriate surrogate for the ex-
perience of all. This results in the problem of "essentializing" or "re-
garding the essence of one's own experience as representative of the
experience of others."4 7 Critical race theorists4 8 were instrumental in
identifying this issue and illustrating its existence in the context of
feminist analysis, pointing out that in many circumstances, the exper-
iences and concerns of privileged, white female academics are not
likely to be those of, say, minority welfare mothers.4"
Accepting the lesson of essentialism does, however, complement
and refine the assertion that subjugation can come in different shapes
and sizes. Thus, if the values of even some women identifiably diverge
from those underlying a legal regime, it is a matter with which to be
reckoned, whether or not practical accommodations actually result.
One attempt at such reckoning is referred to as "relational" feminism.
Relational feminism reflects an effort to identify and apply in le-
gal and other inquiries a set of values based on the shared experiences
fetal protection plans created by businesses may unlawfully deprive women of equal oppor-
tunity in the work force).
44. Lemonade Stand, supra note 41, at 1416.
45. Id. at 1417-18.
46. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Feminism, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate and Secur-
ities Law, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (1995) [hereinafter Feminism, Fairness, and Fiduciary
Duty] ("[O]ne feminist task is to articulate the values manifest in the experience of women,
and to assess various existing legal and social structures for fit with these values.").
47. Id. at 5.
48. See infra Part II.B.
49. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581, 603 (1990) (questioning the theory that some women's experience as mothers
should be asserted for all women). See generally Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist
Legal Theory, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989).
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of those women ascribing to the approach.5" These values, notably
including compassion and caring, may-or may not-be the product
of centuries of male oppression. 51 Relational feminists nonetheless
accept them as beneficial to society, as well as an intuitively comforta-
ble fit.5 2 Thus, relational feminists describe women's physical "poten-
tial for connectedness" as a positive shaper of laudable values53
(whereas another feminist school regards this same potential as the
primary factor exposing women to male invasion).5
Relational feminists generally subscribe to analytic methods be-
lieved to effectuate the values that are to be advanced. 55 These impor-
tantly include the grounding in women's experience referred to
above. 56 This grounding leads to emphasis on the actual context in
which a particular issue is presented.5 1 Contextual emphasis is re-
garded as vital both because it evokes empathy and because it reveals
situational variations that demand and permit case-specific accommo-
dations.58  Rules that are either derived or applied in abstraction
50. See Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor,
89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1187-88 (1991) (explaining relational feminism); Robin West, Juris-
prudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13-42 (1988) [hereinafter Jurisprudence and Gen-
der] (same).
51. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 15 (1988) (discussing the construction of gender roles by men); Jurisprudence and
Gender, supra note 50, at 20-28 (discussing traditional gender norms for women); see also
NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 6 (1978) (discussing the evolution
of women's roles in a male-dominated society). But see, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Femi-
nist Legal Themy, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School,"
38J. LEGAL EDuc. 61, 72-75 (1988) (presenting the "equal-treatment" perspective, which
argues that identification of values unique to the shared experience of women legitimizes
repercussions and exclusions based on those differences); Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing
Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 J. FEMINIST
STUD. 33 (1988) (same).
52. See generally CHODOROW, supra note 51; CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENr VOICE: Psy-
CHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMI-
NINE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION (1984).
53. Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 16-18.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Many of these methods have been developed by or in conjunction with other femi-
nist approaches. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Smith, Women's Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociol-
ogy, in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 84, 84-85 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987) (arguing for the
study of sociology organized from women's perspectives).
56. Crain, supra note 50, at 1187-88.
57. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 51, at 10-11 (advocating the application of feminist
theories to the law and legal education); MariJ. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted
Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613
(1986) (criticizing Rawls's use of abstraction by comparison to contextual feminist meth-
ods); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373
(1986) (asserting that abstractions preclude realistic solutions to problems of inequality).
58. Feminism, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 46, at 11-12.
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therefore are suspect-likely to be somewhere between unreliable
and oppressive. 9
B. Critical Race Theory and Corporate Law
"A central claim of [critical race theory] is that antiracist politics
and legal theory should be informed by the voices of people 'on the
bottom' of discrimination."6" Arguments in support of this claim in-
clude the contention that looking to these voices is likely to lead to
correct substantive results,61 the assertion that calling forth particular
voices may be as important as what is said62 and the contention that,
on issues of race,6" voices on the bottom have more credibility than
the voices of those on the top.64 This bare-bones description of an
increasingly rich literature presents two central questions. First, how
broadly is the concept of "antiracist politics and legal theory" to be
defined? Second, how is one to identify those "on the bottom" with
respect to any particular issue?
For purposes of a corporate law analysis, the second question is
simpler than the first, for it is easy to identify a "bottom" more-or-less
in apposition to the "top." Economically privileged white males have
shaped corporations, corporate law, and corporate-law commentary;65
eliciting the voices of those not sharing all three of those characteris-
tics would, pursuant to a critical race analysis, have intrinsic value if
the issues to be addressed were those within the realm of critical race
concern. This, of course, leads back to, and illuminates, the first ques-
tion. In any context in which "top" and "bottom" are so easily dis-
cerned in terms of race, gender, and economic class, issues within the
realm of critical race analysis clearly are invoked.
59. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 848-49
(1990) (discussing recognition of oppression).
60. Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2002).
61. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Commentary, The Imperial Scholar: Rflections on a Review
of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 569, 571 (1984) (arguing that an omission
of minority voices skews the academic debate on race-related issues); Mari J. Matsuda, Look-
ing to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 362
(1987) (asserting that the legal concept of reparations arises from experience rather than
abstraction).
62. Carbado, supra note 60, at 1299.
63. It should be noted that, as race has come to be regarded as a matter of social
construct rather than genetic immutability, the inclusion of other social categories of ineq-
uity in critical race theorization has become quite natural. Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REv.
1455, 1459 (2002).
64. Carbado, supra note 60, at 1304.
65. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience and the White Man's Burden, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 944 (2002) [hereinafter White Man's Burden].
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The practice of looking to the bottom has been criticized as dam-
aging to the goal of racial equality,6 6 as possibly anti-Semitic67 and
anti-Asian, and as simply being unhelpful. 6' Even those applauding
the practice admit the difficulties arising from the multiracial nature
of racism and the complications of gender, class, and sexual orienta-
tion; in other words, the essentialism problem is alive and well in criti-
cal race theory itself.69 Interestingly, the challenges of managing the
search for the bottom are less in the area of corporate law than in
some other areas simply because the demarcation of haves and have-
nots is so clear. Moreover, for those accepting the lesson of the essen-
tialism critique and endorsing the need for contextualization of analy-
sis, the difficulties of the search for the bottom in fact are part of its
value.
C. Common Cause
It is fair to say that most women, like most racial minorities and
other economically disadvantaged persons, have been outside tradi-
tional power structures, including the upper reaches of political, cor-
porate, and academic hierarchies. As outsiders, they may be expected
to cast an initially skeptical eye toward the normative analyses and pos-
itive laws generated by the traditionally empowered. w
Outsider skepticism encompasses both established corporate law
doctrines and progressive corporate law reforms that invoke directo-
rial power and discretion.71 Corporate law and corporate culture con-
centrate power in the hands of privileged, middle-aged white males
over the fate of (relatively more) diverse shareholders, employees, and
others.7 2 Proposals for corporate overhaul sometimes call for a fur-
66. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL AS-
SAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAw 30-50, 118-37 (1997) (criticizing radical multicultural-
ists' lack of objectivity and reason).
67. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?, 83
CAL. L. REv. 853 (1995).
68. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807, 814-15 (1993).
69. See Carbado, supra note 60, at 1285.
70. See Scales, supra note 57, at 1376-79 (asserting that objective reality is constructed
out of patriarchal myth); JeffreyJ. Pyle, Note, Race, Equality and the Rule of Law: Critical Race
Theorys Attack on the Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C. L. REv. 787, 797 (1999) (describing the
critical race theorists' skepticism of the American legal system).
71. White Man's Burden, supra note 65, at 952.
72. See Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority
Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895 (1996)
(discussing supermajority voting); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as
Nexus of Contracts, 88 IowA L. REv. 1, 8 (2002) (defending the nexus of contracts
approach).
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thering of such concentration. 73 For instance, progressive and team
production appeals to a board that has the discretion and/or duty to
consider nonshareholder interests still are appeals to the usual sus-
pects74 -the group that, even before the adoption of neoclassical
shareholder primacy as a sacred totem,75 was responsible for laws and
policies limiting the opportunities of women and minorities in the
workforce.7 6
Granted the preeminence of the board of directors in both ac-
cepted corporate dogma and proposals for reform, one way for outsid-
ers to react is to do the best they can with what they have. They thus
might resign themselves to the notion that agglomerated capital must,
as a matter of at least temporary practicality, be centrally managed.
The goal of outsiders then might be to mitigate the "necessary evil" of
board-based structures through intense and continuing scrutiny of
board composition and function.
A second, and complementary, reaction is to reimagine some of
the basic assumptions of corporate law. This reimagining then can be
put to use, at least at the margins, in devising practical reforms and in
providing standards for the board scrutiny demanded by the "neces-
sary evil" view.
III. EXPERIENCE, VALUES, SYMBOLS, AND LOGIC
The proposition that outsiders have reason to be skeptical of the
board-centric model of corporate law leads to a series of possible con-
cerns worth enumeration and, in many cases, further investigation.
These propositions, which are related but separable, are the subjects
of separate discussions below. They are as follows: First, although the
abstracted nature of past corporate law discussion has conflated the
actual experiences of outsiders in dealing with corporations with
73. See, e.g., CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILrTY, supra note 20, at 129-34, 157-61 (calling for
lengthening the term of board members and lengthening the time between mandated
disclosure of financial reports as methods of alleviating the pressure on boards to focus on
short-term results).
74. See Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J.
Soc.JusT. 457, 487 (2002) (discussing a 2001 Canadian survey that found that only 9.8% of
board seats in Canada, and only 12.4% of Fortune 500 board seats in the United States,
were held by women); see also Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship
Between the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. Prr. L. REv. 389, 423 n.148
(2002) (citing a 1998 study that stated only 0.6% of senior-level managers in major compa-
nies were African American).
75. See supra Part I.A.
76. See generally Alison A. Gormley, Note, The Underground Exposed: The United States
Corporations' Use of Sweatshops Abroad, and the Abuse of Women, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT''L L. REV.
109 (2001).
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those of non-outsiders, the divergences are worthy of note. Second,
the conclusions of these abstract prior discussions are inconsistent
with the conclusions likely to be reached by outsiders on the basis of
their own experience. Third, some of the central values manifest in
past corporate law analyses are anathema to at least some outsiders.
Fourth, the prevailing symbolic expression of these central values ob-
scures the effect of corporate law on outsider experience, thus help-
ing to explain the first proposition described. Fifth, once the
prevailing symbolism is rejected and analysis is injected with healthy
doses of skepticism and reference to real-world experience, it be-
comes apparent that shareholders of publicly held companies in fact
are unnecessary. Finally, decoding the symbolism and value-laden
structure of existing corporate law supports the conclusion, advanced
as an intuitive matter above, that board-centric, investor-privileging
models by no means are the best choice for outsider endorsement.
A. The Lessons of Experience
The first claim to be examined is that, although the abstract na-
ture of past corporate law discussion has conflated the experiences of
outsiders in dealing with corporations with those of non-outsiders, the
divergence of those experiences is worthy of note. The common
methods of feminists and critical race theorists generally call for an
appeal to the actual voices and a recitation of the actual experiences
of women and minorities in the context of various issues.77 As a pre-
liminary and self-consciously brief foray into this area, this Article can-
not purport to identify, much less exhaust, the possible permutations
of outsider experience in the context of shareholder primacy. It is
relevant, nonetheless, to raise a few brief points about each of the
main roles played in the corporate scenarios usually described by con-
tractarian, progressive, and team production scholars. The first,
shared point is that the roles themselves are non-outsider constructs
that conceal both nuance and possible overlap, therefore risking ulti-
mate preclusion of an adequate consideration of actual experience.
In this regard, it is useful to note that the roles of shareholder, direc-
tor, etc., typically are defined in terms of their relationships to one
another, without regard to the actual characteristics of the persons
occupying the positions described.
77. See supra notes 44-45, 48-58 and accompanying text.
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1. Shareholders.-Contractarians have identified a corporation's
shareholders as its passive, relatively vulnerable providers of capital,78
but also, as a group, as the corporation's spectral monitor of manag-
ers. 9 As noted above, this combination of functions renders the
shareholder group as the corporate end-all; the corporation's business
is conducted for the purpose of increasing the value of the sharehold-
ers' interests.80 Progressives typically do not draw a privileging distinc-
tion between shareholders and other providers of capital, human or
otherwise." Thus, they have argued that the duty of those managing
the business runs not only to a corporation's workers, but also to its
creditors; some have made proposals, such as lengthening the terms
of the board of directors, that would tend to enhance the sharehold-
ers' pacific nature.82 Team production analysts similarly argue for a
more-or-less equal managerial duty running to shareholders, credi-
tors, and workers (and to anyone else with a "team-specific" input).83
The difference is in the type of the duty, which rather than being
fiducial in nature is to serve as a mediating hierarch. 4 In this view,
too, shareholders play a passive role." In none of the approaches
described are possible divergences of interest among shareholders
specifically addressed,86 except in terms of taste for risk and institu-
tional character.8 7
Without a doubt, outsiders actually have begun participating in
the financial markets in record numbers.88 In part, this is because of
work-force participation that brings with it retirement plan benefits
78. See, e.g., supra note 6. With certain exceptions (see, e.g., Black & Scholes, supra
note 29), contractarians have not been particularly interested in the role of creditors, who
of course also play a role in providing capital.
79. R. William Ide, Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creating a Culture of
Greater Board Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REV. 829, 836 (2003).
80. F ASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 35-39.
81. See Communitarianism, supra note 15, at 3-4, 16-18.
82. See Team Production, supra note 21, at 249-53 (suggesting that boards exist not just to
protect shareholders but to protect the investments of all members of the corporate team).
83. Id. at 276-87.
84. Id. at 250.
85. E.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 522
(1990).
86. See id. at 525 (noting the various potential causes for shareholder passivity).
87. See Ralph K. Winter, On "Protecting the Ordinary Investor," 63 WASH. L. REV. 881, 883-
88 (1988) (distinguishing among different types of investors).
88. Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the
Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CoRP. L. 225, 227-29 (2001) [hereinafter
Euphoric Market Transactions] (discussing the increase in outsider investment prior to the
burst of the bubble).
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invested in the employers' and other issuers' securities.8 9 In this ca-
pacity, outsider participation in corporate "ownership" frequently has
been through a financial intermediary, such as an investment fund.
Moreover, in some instances, outsiders have invested in corporate
debt rather than corporate equity. Nonetheless, it is clear that the
boom of the late 1990s lured outsiders as well as non-outsiders into
making direct, voluntary financial investments in corporate stock.9"
The claim thus is not that the capital markets are intentionally
discriminatory in excluding outsider investment or that outsiders have
special purity with respect to their existing motivation to share Ameri-
can wealth, to get their piece of the American financial pie. The
claim is that those on the bottom are not indifferent to the pie's ingre-
dients, to who the baker is, or to how the size of the pieces is deter-
mined. They are experienced, in fact, with the notion that increasing
the size of a pie does not automatically assure that everyone gets a
slice (much less a bigger slice).
Stock market participation in fact has been said by non-outsider
commentators to be democratizing.9' To every appearance, access to
participation indeed seems color-blind.92 This may be as it may be,
but outsiders have learned to be suspicious of neutrality claims. Thus,
for instance, the denial of pregnancy benefits to men and women
alike once was held by the Supreme Court to be gender-neutral, 93 but
women experienced the denial differently than did men. It is entirely
possible, even indisputable, that persons of different gender, race,
and/or economic class experience financial market participation in
different ways: studies show that racial minorities are far less likely
than whites to participate in equity markets.94 It would be interesting
to know the actual proportions in which they hold corporate debt
rather than equity.95 It also would be interesting to verify the intui-
89. See generally Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1501, 1505-13 (2004) (setting forth the significant tax advantages that accompany certain
employer-provided pension plans).
90. See id. at 1535 (describing pension participation by various racial groups).
91. Cf Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL.
L. REv. 571, 596 (2001) (arguing that the privatization of welfare would transfer power
from the government to local communities, increasing access to participation).
92. SeeJoseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Pro-
erty, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1283, 1450 (1996) (suggesting that property rules contain distribu-
tive principles that prevent the exclusion of groups of people based on race).
93. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974). The Court found that "so long as the
line drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the courts will not interpose their judg-
ment as to the appropriate stopping point." Id. at 495.
94. Brown, supra note 89, at 1536-38.
95. See generally Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Role of Law in Managing Market Moods: The
Whole Story of Jason, Who Bought High, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 111, 123-25 (2000) (book
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tion that outsiders tended to be some of the latest entrants into the
speculative frenzy of the 1990s and thus to be the hardest hit when the
bubble collapsed.9 6 If outsiders' experience with the role of share-
holder indeed is that it is somewhat perilous and not quite what the
hype has made it out to be, they well may value the structures and
rules privileging shareholders differently than those for whom partici-
pation has been more successful. In other words, the interests of out-
siders in participating in the economy as investors very well may be
subordinate to their interests in participating as workers and consum-
ers. This Article contends that the ingrained investor-privileging doc-
trines and imagery of corporate law stand in the way of addressing this
matter in order to achieve the appropriate balance.
2. Managers.-As described above, contractarians prefer to re-
gard management (in the form of the board of directors) as the agent
of the owners of the residual value of the corporation and therefore as
responsible for maximizing that residual value. 7 Progressives agree
that this is the prevailing legal and social view of the role of the board,
but call for a change in its regard for workers, creditors, and consum-
ers.9 8 Team production scholars argue that, as a matter of current
legal structure as well as normative preference, regard for workers and
creditors already is implicit in the board's function.9 9
However one defines "management"-as the corporation's board
of directors, as its board and executive officers, or as its highest eche-
lon of employees-it is clear that it is a group that is far more heavily
populated by white males than by women and minorities.1 l ° Since
women and minorities are, in fact, significantly "better" represented
as workers and consumers, and, for that matter, as investors, it is the
duties, incentives, and privileges of management that are most suspect
to outsiders. For instance, a model that aligns manager interests with
those of shareholders by permitting managers to reward themselves
with gigantic incentive payments obviously benefits privileged insiders
much more directly than it improves the lot of outsiders. It smacks, in
review) [hereinafter Managing Market Moods] (noting the possible effect of federal law on
market moods).
96. It has been shown that at least some minorities abandoned the equity markets post-
bubble and missed the subsequent rally. Brown, supra note 89, at 1537.
97. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
100. See Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportu-
nity, 85 MINN. L. REv. 587, 600 (2000) ("[W]hite men account for a disproportionate share
of executive, administrative, and management jobs.").
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fact, of the unhappy minority experience with the self-privileging con-
duct of the managers of British colonial investment.1"1
Token representations of women, minorities, workers, etc., on
boards are, of course, ostensible incursions by outsiders. 10 2 These rep-
resentations are, however, unlikely to lead to anything like rapid
meaningful reform. The tokens elected to boards, unless responsible
in some fairly immediate legal or emotional way to those they theoreti-
cally represent, are likely to assume-indeed are likely already to have
assumed-the attitudes of the majority board members.1"' This might
be short-handed as the "Clarence Thomas argument," and its logical
extension is the expressed fear that the presence of tokens on the
board may be a placebo interfering with more meaningful change. 0 4
101. See Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 Am. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 903, 909, 932 (1997) (discussing the colonialist assumption that Western
thoughts and systems provided a universal definition of civilization); Ruth-Arlene W.
Howe, Transracial Adoption (TRA): Old Prejudices and Discrimination Float Under a New Halo, 6
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 409, 457 n.277 (1997) (explaining how the two aspects of philanthropic
colonialism-paternalism and clinicalism-form the basis for the concept of "the white
man's burden"); Ali Khan, The Dignity of Labor, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 289, 291 n.6
(2001) (noting that throughout history colonizers have likened the colonized people to
children, "capable of improvement under the guidance of colonizers"). See generally WIN-
THROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RACISM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1974).
102. See Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Direc-
tors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1365, 1384-88 (2002) (commenting on the "new" corporate
social responsibility movement and its effects on the diversity of corporate boards of direc-
tors); Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85, 124 (2000)
(listing the benefits of transitioning corporate America from a segregated power to a di-
verse and multi-cultural one).
103. E.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What
Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1688-90 (2004) (establish-
ing the likelihood that racial minorities at the top of the corporate hierarchy will neither
racially reform the corporation nor engage in door-opening activities for other minorities);
John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT:
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13, 25-28 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Ten-
brunsel eds., 1996) (describing how individuals can get caught up in the attitude of the
majority and subsequently be altered by it).
104. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 103, at 1685-86 (discussing how the presence of
racial minorities at a senior level might increase the demand for racial comfort and same-
ness within the corporation). But cf, e.g., David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board
Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 50-51 (2003) (describing increases in firm value
correlating with board diversity); Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Corporate
Democracy": Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 735, 739-40
(2003) (setting forth general benefits of diversity at the director and executive levels of the
corporation); Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the
Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 837, 845-56 (2003) (analyzing
the many benefits of diversity within the corporation, including potentially quelling corpo-
rate corruption).
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3. Workers.-Workers are, to contractarians, something like part
of the landscape against which managers and shareholders act out
their dramas. In other words, they receive relatively little attention.
When they are discussed, they are assumed to be canny creatures of
free will, making judgments in their own self-interest and attempting
to extract concessions from management. 10 5 Progressives pooh-pooh
this notion, contending that workers are in a position at least as vul-
nerable as that of shareholders and deserve the protections of a fidu-
cial relationship with management. 106 Team production scholars
claim that neither shareholders, workers, nor any other group should
claim more from management (that is, the board of directors) than its
services as mediating hierarch.10 7 As a general matter, the con-
tractarian, progressive, and team production accounts fail to seriously
assess the possibility that different workers have different experiences.
Generally left without comment in corporate law analysis, then, is
the fact that, as workers, women and minorities have experienced
years of overt discrimination and other inequity. °s Even recently, the
average female worker made seventy-one percent of the earnings of
the average male;109 the average African-American male worker made
seventy-eight percent of the income of the average white male. 1 Dis-
parities between the highest paid workers and the rank-and-file also
are well documented. 1 This means, of course, that identification of
a single worker "class," the interests of which are to be considered by
the board, balanced against investor interests, etc., conflates a number
of demarcations, including those of gender, race, and organizational
hierarchy.
It is true, even from the perspective of outsiders, that it can be
quite useful to define a worker class in terms of significant attributes
105. Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corpo-
rate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 581, 586-87 (2002).
106. Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 305-11
(1998).
107. Team Production, supra note 21, at 250.
108. See supra note 39.
109. B. Tobias Isbell, Comment, Gender Inequality and Wage Differentials Between the Sexes:
Is It Inevitable or Is There an Answer?, 50 WASH. U. J. URn. & CONTEMP. L. 369, 369 (1996).
110. LEX K. LARSON, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.09, at 244-245 (2d ed. 1996);
see also Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litiga-
tion: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality" Excuse, 18 BERKELEYJ.
EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 238 (1997) (describing the wage differentials between men, women,
and minorities). See generally Chinhui Juhn, Labor Market Dropouts and Trends in the Wages of
Black and White Men, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 643 (2003).
111. See Gary Burtless, Effects of Growing Wage Disparities and Changing Family Composition
on the U.S. Income Distribution 1-2 (Ctr. on Soc. & Econ. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 4,
1999) (noting the dramatic increase in earnings inequality in the 1980s and 1990s).
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lacked: these are participation in management and financial indepen-
dence from employment. The interests of many white male workers,
as a matter of this culturally shaped, common-sense definition, indeed
may be closer to those of women and minority workers (or, for that
matter, women and minorities generally) than to those of managers
or investors generally. This is a leap of faith, however, and one easily
can imagine various worker-empowerment solutions pursuant to
which relatively privileged workers' interests supplant those of the rel-
atively unprivileged. In any event, meaningful worker empowerment
is beyond the realm of actual American experience, although no
doubt is suggested at the elusive margin between workers and
managers. 1
12
4. Consumers.-Contractarians view consumers much the same
way that they view workers: they are poorly sketched, self-interested
antagonists to the interests of shareholders and, therefore, of manag-
ers.11 3 They are, however, regarded as the incidental beneficiaries of
the increasing number of technological developments achieved by
corporations in their quest for profit. 14 Consumers are the recipients
of some sympathy from progressives, although generally to a lesser
extent than workers. 115 Team production analysis generally concerns
itself with those who have "team-specific" inputs; as a usual matter, a
consumer's cash or credit is not specifically dedicated to a particular
corporation and she or he therefore is not a member of the team
served by the board." 6 Again, in none of these accounts is a possible
disparity of interest recognized.
It is relatively easy to raise numerous unhappy consequences that
profit-driven, shareholder-privileging corporate decisions have had
on, e.g., wearers of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device,' 1 7 users of
silicon breast implants,' 8 and ghetto children enticed into violence
and theft by Nike's sneakers dujour.1' 9 It is well known that lending
practices discriminate on the basis of race (and zip codes which not
112. For discussion of a model awarding employees with ownership rights, see infta Part
IV.B.3.
113. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 15.
116. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
117. Sylvia A. Law, Tort Liability and the Availability of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices in the
United States, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 339, 362-68 (1997).
118. Douglas A. Orr, Saline Breast Implants: A Tricky Solution, 25 RuTGERS L. REc. 1
(2001).
119. Cf Troy Y. Nelson, Commentary, If Clothes Make the Person, Do Uniforms Make the
Student?: Constitutional Free Speech Rights and Student Uniforms in Public Schools, 118 ED. LAw.
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coincidentally have racial correlatives). 2 ' Women and minorities pay
higher car prices than do white males.121 These simple facts ade-
quately demonstrate (as does common sense) that there is no such
thing as a single consumer "class." In fact, consumption is not a mat-
ter of class at all: obviously, everyone is a consumer. As individuals
with different attributes engage in the activity of consumption, how-
ever, they have had dramatically different experiences. Claims, then,
that consumers, as a group, are better off if there is more choice be-
tween products122 or if products carry a lower price, simply are not
well thought out.1 23
5. Crossing Lines.-The concept of "class" has a fixed sociologi-
cal meaning that might distinguish among at least some of the group-
ings that could be relevant to development of corporate law (i.e.,
identification of a "worker" or "working" class). 124 Clearly recognizing
that consumption is merely an "activity" in which everyone engages,
rather than a "class," nonetheless tempts one to "declassify" the con-
structs of "worker," "investor," and "management." "Investment" is an
activity in which consumers, workers, and managers also engage. In
the vernacular, "management" also is a type of "work." In determin-
ing one's own interests and preferences it is expedient to consider all
of one's activities, but important to do so in light of the practical limi-
tations of one's experience as a woman or as a minority or with eco-
nomic deprivation. It is easy, then, to imagine the voice of someone
with experience "at the bottom" of economic society calling for a bet-
ter paying job, and therefore, at least for some period of time, for
more "worker-regarding" behavior by managers, and caring very little
REP. 1, 3-4 (1997) (noting how school uniforms decrease violence among students over
designer clothing or sneakers).
120. See, e.g., FRANKLINJ. JAMES ET AL., CTR. FOR PUB.-PRIVATE SECTOR COOPERATION, DIS-
CRIMINATION, SEGREGATION AND MINORITY HOUSING CONDITIONS IN SUNBELT CITIES: A
STUDY OF DENVER, HOUSTON & PHOENIX 92, 96 (1983).
121. For a 1991 study revealing discrimination in car negotiations, see Ian Ayres, Fair
Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REv. 817, 825-
41 (1991).
122. Fernando R. Laguarda, Unleashing "Instant Messaging" from Regulatory Oversight, 10
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 24, 34 (2004), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i3/article24.pdf.
123. As one simple illustration of this point, imagine, for a moment, the experience of a
harried single parent dealing with a child pausing in the grocery aisle before the latest
high-calorie, high-fat snack craze or clamoring for the latest violent video game.
124. See generally Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and the
United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542 (1999) (discussing and criticizing a sociologi-
cal single-class approach to labor law); Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and
the Pursuit of Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1995) (dis-
cussing and criticizing a sociological single-category approach to either race or class in the
post-Civil Rights Era).
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for the claim that society overall would thereby lose the theoretical
benefit of the pure principal-agent model.
B. Posited Voices
The second claim made above, and anticipated in discussion of
the first claim, is that the abstract conclusions of past corporate law
analyses are inconsistent with the conclusions likely to be reached by
outsiders on the basis of their own experience. Here, the point to be
reckoned with is that eliciting the actual voices of experience at the
bottom of corporate law issues is an unaccustomed task.125 The actual
voices of outsiders thus have yet to be heard on the subject of share-
holder primacy and the various issues it raises. Substituting a posited
outsider voice or voices is a dangerous-in fact, ultrahazardous-ac-
tivity that nonetheless may be unavoidable in light of the current state
of corporate law debate, which usually has addressed the alleged con-
cerns of workers, consumers, and investors without considering the
possible divergences of gender, race, and/or economic strata. 126 In-
cremental, if tentative, enlightenment thus may lie in an imagined ex-
change on the subject of a few outsider concerns.
Consider, then, the following, non-exhaustive iteration: the con-
cerns of middle-aged women facing increased health problems due to
hormone replacement therapy, 127 the concerns of third-world workers
employed under sweatshop working conditions, 128 and the concerns
of low-level employees who lost their retirement nest eggs in the boom
and bust of the late 1990s. 12 9 Contractarians might assert that, on an
ex ante basis, the healthy economy theoretically fostered by corporate
profit-maximization so sufficiently betters the lives of the masses that
everyone (including those who will become tort victims but do not yet
know it) willingly accepts its costs. They also might observe that hav-
ing a job at a sweatshop is better than having no job, pointing as evi-
dence to sweatshop workers' own demonstrated preferences in taking
125. See Lemonade Stand, supra note 41, at 1413-14 (alluding to the paucity of corporate
legal publications from a feminist perspective).
126. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Assumptions About Relationships Reflected in the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 17 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 222 (2002) (discussing the lack of application of femi-
nist approaches to corporate and securities law topics).
127. See generally Leticia M. Diaz, Hormone Replacement Therapy, or Just Eat More Meat: The
Technological Hare vs. The Regulatory Tortoise, 27 B.C. ENv-rL. Are. L. REv. 391 (2000) (explor-
ing the correlations between diet, therapy, and hormonal upsets in women).
128. See Gormley, supra note 76, at 110-14 (describing the abusive effects of third-world
sweatshops on women).
129. See Managing Market Moods, supra note 95, at 111-15 (discussing the stock market
boom and bust of the late 1990s).
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such employment. They also might comment that the increasing par-
ticipation of women and minorities in financial markets evidences
their "voice" on the matter of corporate governance-their "vote"
with their pocketbooks. More sympathetically, progressives and team
production scholars would acknowledge each of the problems
presented by the outsiders' iteration and would attempt to offer
board-reliant solutions.
The outsiders' response to the contractarians (which also implies
a response to progressive and team production scholars) presumably
is that "choices" to accept health risks, to accept sweatshop conditions,
and to accept corporate law as currently structured are completely il-
lusory-exactly like the "choice" that women and minorities make to
work in lower-paying jobs than white males and to pay higher prices
for their cars. In other words, at least some of those on the bottom
simply have been taken along on someone else's ride without perceiv-
ing realistic alternatives. To the extent participation in, e.g., financial
markets is anything like a real matter of choice, it still is entirely possi-
ble that women and minorities have been sold a bill of goods. It is, in
fact, more than likely that outsiders participate as shareholders with-
out necessarily and/or consciously subscribing to the notion that cor-
porate directors serve as their agents cum trustees cum father figures.
In fact, positing conscious outsider acceptance of a model in
which a group of predominantly privileged, white male directors are
charged with maximizing profit is laughable. For that matter, so is
assuming outsider endorsement of a model that permits shareholders
exhibiting at least some diversity to empower a monolith of directors
by abdicating control and responsibility for the use of their funds,
thus vanishing into faceless anonymity vis-A-vis possible and entirely
predictable adverse consequences to nonshareholders. 130 Just as im-
portantly, if outsiders adopted as a working premise the notion that
directors should act to maximize the return on one activity (invest-
ing), they clearly would accept the risk of adverse effect on the activi-
ties of working and consuming. Outsiders individually and collectively
might wish to consider quite closely whether higher wages and lower
consumer prices would be more to their benefit than increased share
130. Accepting the principal-agent model would represent acceptance of a dichotomy in
the lives of the purported principals: the separation of home/work spheres that has been
decried by feminists thus is echoed in the creation of personal/financial spheres of interest
and enterprise. See Lemonade Stand, supra note 41, at 1445 (noting that feminist analysis
would deplore the separation of various social and legal structures seen in corporate law).
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price (particularly if increased share price is subject to rapid and un-
predictable deflation).'
C. On Values, Shirking, and Power
The third concern listed above is that some of the central values
manifest in past corporate law analyses are anathema to at least some
outsiders. The clash of values in part has to do with responsibility.
One of the central problems of the principal-agent relationship
identified by contractarians is shirking. 132 Fearing that managers will
loll about, accepting compensation without adequately exploiting bus-
iness opportunities (like signing the hottest sports figure to pimp ex-
pensive sneakers) or undertaking enough high-risk enterprises (like
rushing the latest pharmaceutical breakthrough to market), con-
tractarians state that the would-be shirkers must be monitored. This
monitoring must be the concern of a single class (shareholders), lest
the multiplication of groups of principals lead to problems of the
commons and inadequate monitoring incentives overall.133  Giving
shareholders the "residual" claim to the corporation's earnings is
thought to provide the appropriate motivation.13 4
Somewhat perplexingly, given the contractarian emphasis on the
role of shareholders as monitors, it is not unusual for corporate com-
mentators in general to allude to the powerlessness of individual
shareholders, both in support of a shareholder primacy norm (since
shareholders, unlike other groups such as, say, the wily day laborers
theorized by contractarians, have no ability to bargain over specific
situational accommodations) and otherwise.13 5 A shareholder pri-
macy norm effectively applauds and continues this state of powerless-
ness, assuring shareholders that they are expected to be children in
131. See Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 Hous. L. REv. 99, 100-
01 (2003) [hereinafter Corporate Governance] (comparing the effects of the Enron scandal
on employees whose retirement savings were locked into Enron stock with those of top-
level management, who received large employment compensation packages).
132. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Building the Basic Course Around Intra-Firm Relations, 34 GA. L.
REv. 785, 788-89 (2000).
133. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and
the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213,
261 (1999) (stating that a shareholder has no motivation to participate in a monitoring
coalition when she can receive the benefits of the monitoring without incurring its costs).
134. See generally Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1283 (1998) (finding
that shareholders received a higher return where the board is active and independent of
management).
135. See, e.g., Black, supra note 85, at 530-36 (discussing how the legal rules governing
shareholder voting make it hard, if not impossible, for an individual shareholder to obtain
a sizable share of a company).
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financial matters, that they need never grow up, need never seek ac-
tive involvement, and need never accept responsibility for the actions
of the enterprises operated for their benefit. The shirking that is
thought unacceptable for managers thus is heartily endorsed for
shareholders.
The paternalism inherent in this picture is clear, and paternalism
emphatically is not, from the standpoint of feminists and critical race
theorists, a value to be nurtured.136 Without a doubt, the patriarchal-
board/passive-shareholder dichotomy permits and encourages share-
holders to ignore the possible exploitation of third parties while pro-
viding the very means of exploitation.137 This is, among other things,
a form of failure to care decried by relational feminists.' 38
D. The Logic of Symbols
The fourth claim made above is that the prevailing symbolic ex-
pression of the central values of corporate law seduces public imagina-
tion, leaving observers disinclined to examine the effect of corporate
law on outsider experience. The seductive symbol in question is the
entrepreneur-Henry Ford before he went public. 139
The introduction to this Article referred to the role of the public
shareholders as "owners" of the corporation as a guiding myth based
on the perceived operation of solely owned businesses. In the solely
owned business, those who control the business enjoy the net benefits
of its operation. They may be expected to spend some amount of
time and energy in figuring out how to choose to maximize those ben-
efits. This aligns with assumptions of law and economics scholars, 140 is
a matter of common sense, and is a more-or-less attractive sociopoliti-
cal image.1 4 1 In hearing about the sole owner, it seems easy, and a
matter of common sense, to anticipate entrepreneurial enterprise
leading to social progress. The term "entrepreneurship" thus con-
jures the image of men in garages building cars, computers, and other
136. See Marie-Andree Jacob, On Silencing and Slicing: Presumed Consent to Post-Mortem Or-
gan "Donation" in Diversified Societies, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 239, 245 (2003) (com-
menting on the general discomfort with paternalism in current bioethical literature,
especially in feminist approaches).
137. Lemonade Stand, supra note 41, at 1431.
138. For a discussion of relational feminism, see supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
139. See Douglas G. Baird, In Coase's Footsteps, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 23, 32-36 (2003) (dis-
cussing Henry Ford's extraordinary qualities that enabled him to succeed as an
entrepreneur).
140. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
141. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288, 289
(1980).
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worthy devices, soon to be marketed to the public through entities
steadily increasing in size. The imagery is quite important because it
conveys a promise of progress for both society and the individuals in-
volved and generally disregards the possibility that profits may, rather
than resulting from useful innovation, simply be extracted from
others, such as advertisement-sodden children.' 4 2
When it is thought desirable to replicate entrepreneurial enter-
prise on a larger scale (Henry Ford going public), it is simple to imag-
ine that a similar incentive structure must be employed-that a
composite "sole owner" group must be permitted to enjoy the net
benefits of corporate operation in order to be properly motivated to
maximize those benefits by engaging in the inventive activity that will
benefit society. The difficulty, of course, in this replication lies in the
inability of the composite group to engage directly in the incentive
activity desired. Between capital provider and inventors, management
enters the scene.
At this point, the analogy between solely owned and public enter-
prise simply breaks down. There are two reasons for the disintegra-
tion. First, although sole owners of businesses reasonably have profit
in mind, they also are clearly entitled to ignore profitability. Neither
the law nor any legal academic ever has come up with a comfortable
large-enterprise surrogate for the sole owner's ability to self-disregard.
Second, upon the emergence of management in corporate law analy-
sis, the inventors simply disappear. Both of these points are discussed
below.
1. The Freedom to Self-Disregard.-As stated above, sole owners-
that is, those we think of as socially valued entrepreneurs-can, when
they choose, moderate their self-regard. Out of respect for individual
rights (a non-outsider construct)143 we do not require that they exer-
cise regard for others, but we do not fear that when it occurs it will
mean the end of innovation; on the basis of experience, we know that
it will not.
142. See Dennis Crouch, The Social Welfare of Advertising to Children, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 179, 180 (2002) ("[A]dvertising to children has become very big business.");
see also Theresa A. Gabaldon, Joe Camel Explains It to the Board: Corporate Law and the Exploita-
tion of Children, 13 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2006).
143. See Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 9 (viewing the individual as inherently
more valuable than a collective social entity). But see ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITU-
TIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994) (criticizing a conserva-
tive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment focused in part on individual freedom
and instead arguing for a progressive interpretation focused on the positive liberties of
societal participation, work, and intimacy).
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Fearing management shirking and opportunism, no one has de-
vised a clear-cut way to permit managers to disregard shareholder in-
terests. Being told only that they are to manage for the benefit of the
"owners" (as opposed to themselves or others who might suborn
them),144 managers must form some notion of what that benefit is.
For want of the more specific guidance from owners that generally has
been denied by corporate law's insistence on shareholder passivity,
coupled with the potential difficulties of collective action in a private
property context, it is easy to see how profitability has become the
surrogate for the self-regarding interests of the "owners," without in
any way reflecting the sole owner's ability to self-disregard. 45
This analytic gap sometimes has been excused by reference to
private philanthropy. 46 Thus, it is true that once managers have
earned profits for shareholders, the shareholders are free to dispense
them to charitable causes. It would seldom be obvious to sharehold-
ers faced with this freedom that they might "share the wealth" with the
very workers, consumers, and community hosts who contributed to its
production. Even if the opportunity for wealth-sharing were readily
discerned, interposing the steps of distribution to shareholders and
redistribution to worthy contributors hardly seems very efficient. This
is particularly true if, e.g., consumers or the environment already have
suffered physical harm.
Corporate constituency statutes permitting directors to consider
the interests of nonshareholders without fear of personal liability
might be straight-facedly said to address these concerns. 47 Of longer
standing, most, if not all, state statutes boast a provision generally
granting a corporation all the powers of an individual and specifically
enumerating the power to make charitable contributions.14 On the
basis of experience, however, neither the "powers" nor the "corporate
constituency" provisions appear to have had the power to override the
144. See Theoretical Framework, supra note 3, at 595 (noting that the problem created by
the separation of ownership and control in the corporation is to prevent management
from acting in its own interest).
145. Given the media's portrayals of the short-term nature of shareholding toward the
end of the twentieth century, it also is easy to see how share price became a surrogate for
profitability and thus for the interests of the "owners." See Managing Market Moods, supra
note 95, at 111-12 (alluding to the media's skewed portrayal of the stock market).
146. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy from a Corporate Governance Perspec-
tive, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rv. 1091, 1092-94 (1997) (questioning management's role in mak-
ing decisions about philanthropic spending as well as the overall purpose and place of
corporate philanthropy).
147. Theoretical Framework, supra note 3, at 607.
148. See id. at 601 (discussing the relationship between charitable contributions and cor-
porate purpose).
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practical incentives and psychological pressures leading to behavior
that apparently conforms to a profit/price-maximizing ideology. 49
Conscious of the void, many corporate progressives have at-
tempted to provide, not a method for directors sometimes to disre-
gard the interests of shareholders, but a definite mandate that they do
so. 150 This is accomplished by constructing a legally enforceable duty
to other corporate constituents. These attempts have foundered as a
practical matter; as a theoretical matter, they also encounter difficul-
ties in terms of specifying how directors, acting at their peril, are to
balance conflicting interests.' 5 ' Team production analysis attempts
not to provide the necessary specification, but to smooth over its ab-
sence.' 52 This approach in effect casts the board of directors as the
ultimate "black box," resulting in substantially more concentration of
power than many outsiders rationally would regard as comfortable.
2. The Vanishing Inventor.-Contractarians long since have re-
jected the symbolism of the entrepreneur, recasting managers and
risk-bearers as the meaningful actors in economic life.15" In doing so,
they have lost sight of the innovators actually responsible for the in-
vention of new products, processes, etc. In large part this is because
profitability, more or less the touchstone of the manager seeking to
maximize the residual value of the firm for its ultimate risk-bearers,
does not demand innovation. Profitability, in fact, does not concep-
tually discriminate between simple extraction of money from third
parties and the creation of new value.15 4
Although unsung and largely invisible in corporate analysis, we
know that innovators do continue to exist.155 We also know some sig-
nificant number of them function outside of the umbrella of large
organizations: small companies have developed one-half of the inno-
149. See id. at 594 (finding that the corporate structure creates incentives for directors to
favor stockholders' interests).
150. Communitarianism, supra note 15, at 16-22.
151. Theoretical Framework, supra note 3, at 595-99.
152. See Team Production, supra note 21, at 288-89 (arguing that corporate law should,
and in fact does, encourage directors to serve the joint interests of the corporate team).
153. See Fama, supra note 141, at 289 (laying to rest the "attractive concept" of "entrepre-
neur" and distinguishing the separate functions of management and risk-bearing).
154. Cf Theresa Gabaldon, Experiencing Limited Liability: On Insularity and Inbreeding in
Corporate Law, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw, supra note 15, at 111, 128 (arguing that the
"benefits of limited liability are not attributable to an affirmative desire to impose costs on
third parties," but to lower risk).
155. See generally Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World, Unite! A Call for Collective Action by
Emplyee-Inventors, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 673, 674 (1997) (discussing the role of the em-
ployee-inventor in the corporate context).
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vations now reaching the market. 5 6 Without a doubt, this is a phe-
nomenon worth study and further comment, as are the relationships
between innovators, capital-providers, and their managerial interface.
E. The Emperor's New Clothes
The fifth claim made above is that once we reject the romantic
analogy of the entrepreneur, inject a bit of skepticism about tradi-
tional corporate structuring, and toss in a dash of realism, we are in a
position to recognize that there really is nothing special for the share-
holders of public corporations to do. As an initial matter, we can eas-
ily note that public shareholders (unlike at least some shareholders of
closely held firms) emphatically are not managers; neither are they
inventors. 157 Their remaining formal role, then, is that of capital
provider. 1
58
Various concomitant but subsidiary roles from time to time have
been ascribed to public shareholders. These subsidiary roles generally
are related to the monitoring function described by contractarians.
They might be seen as the repository of the ultimate governing au-
thority, owing to (1) their ability to deny capital to the corporation in
the first place, (2) their ability to elect the board of directors, (3) their
ability to sell their shares to someone else who is interested in electing
the board of directors, 159 and/or (4) their ability to enforce the fidu-
ciary duties of corporate managers 6 ° by bringing derivative causes of
action on behalf of the corporation.' 6 '
From a practical standpoint, these subsidiary roles may be rather
quickly dismissed. First, the initial public offering bubble of the late
1990s shows just how limited the perspicacity of both individual and
institutional investors can be in discerning the worth of capital-seek-
ing companies.16 2 Second, shareholders of public corporations are in-famous for electing the slate of directors that management
156. Harold C. Livesay, Entrepreneurial Dominance in Businesses Large and Small, Past and
Present, 63 Bus. HIST. REV. 1, 4 & n.7 (1989) (referring to companies with fewer than 500
employees).
157. See Stout, supra note 11, at 1191 (arguing that shareholders have limited power to
control the corporation).
158. See id. at 1191-92 (rejecting the idea that shareholders own a corporation merely
because they provide capital).
159. Team Production, supra note 21, at 310; Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federal-
ism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 215, 216-18 (1999) [hereinafter Preemption and Federalism].
160. Preemption and Federalism, supra note 159, at 220.
161. Team Production, supra note 21, at 292-93.
162. See generally Corporate Governance, supra note 131, at 101 (discussing the market in
late 1990s).
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suggests.1 63 Third, there is empirical evidence that shareholders of
public corporations who "vote with their feet" by selling in large num-
bers to someone who wishes to install new (presumably superior)
management are not necessarily disposing of systematically misman-
aged firms.1 64 Fourth, the ability to bring derivative causes of action
has been so severely restricted 65 and the liability of officers and direc-
tors so limited 1 as to diminish the right to relative triviality.167
A somewhat more descriptively accurate role also has been as-
signed to the shareholders of public corporations. Shareholders
widely are described as the "residual claimants" vis-a-vis the corpora-
tion. 168 Accordingly, when "profits increase, the shareholders benefit
from this bounty; if profits decline, shareholders feel the loss. ' ' 169 The
role, then, translates to the acceptance of the risk of corporate loss in
exchange for the possibility of theoretically unlimited gain.
In considering the importance of the role of residual claimants, it
is important to note that, given the existence of limited liability, share-
holders cannot feel the loss of anything beyond their initial capital
input.17 ° This is exactly the kind of risk that a creditor accepts; the
only difference has to do with the size of the risk. Risk differentials
163. See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American
Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 325-26 (Supp. 1998) (suggesting that management's
control over corporate information and proxy solicitation at the corporation's expense, as
well as stockholders' general passivity, allow them to influence a shareholder's voting
decision).
164. See Anup Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from
Operating and Stock Returns, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 721, 742-44 (2003) (con-
cluding takeover targets are no less profitable than other companies); see also DAVID J.
RAVENSCRAFr & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 68-70, 101-
03, 122 (1987) (concluding from a study of 6000 manufacturing firm acquisitions that (1)
before acquisition, acquired companies generally had above average profitability for their
industries, although those companies acquired by tender offer had profits slightly below
the industry average, and (2) profitability tended to decline after acquisition, except in
those companies acquired by tender offer, where profitability neither declined nor
improved).
165. Pinto, supra note 163, at 342.
166. Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and the
Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 387 (1994).
167. The right also is one regularly only exercised at the instigation of self-interested
attorneys. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects of
Shareholder Litigation as an Exercise in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of General Applica-
bility, 73 MINN. L. REv. 425, 439-40 (1988) (highlighting the ethical problems that arise by
lawyer solicitations of various corporate derivative suits).
168. See Director Accountability, supra note 28, at 410 (explaining contractarian arguments
for shareholder primacy).
169. Id.
170. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1985); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corpora-
tion, 50 MD. L. REv. 80, 81 n.1 (1991).
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are, of course, most usually dealt with by adjusting rates of return.1 71
In other words, highly compensated, long-term creditors would do
just as well as shareholders when it comes to the task of bearing risk.
This analysis casts into doubt the notion that shareholders must
receive the prospect of unlimited returns in order to induce them to
accept the limited risk of loss of their capital. All that shareholders
logically should require is an adequate return to make foregoing alter-
nate investments worthwhile. The real role of shareholders of public
corporations, then, is to permit some amount of capital-raising in
which the terms of repayment and return are relatively unspecified.
This may be convenient for the corporation, but is not obviously nec-
essary for entities with any sort of proven track record any more than
open-ended repayment terms are necessary for borrowers of loans to
buy homes. 172 Even its convenience for the corporation is not a fore-
gone conclusion, given the fact that the corporate debt market is the
source of much more capital than the stock market. 173
Ironically, although shareholders are not necessary to be residual
risk bearers (and in fact are not truly residual risk bearers, given lim-
ited liability), they (or someone like them) are necessary to "absorb" a
corporation's generation of profits in excess of its costs, including its
cost of capital. After all, were there no deemed motive to benefit
171. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 170, at 97. According to Easterbrook and Fis-
chel, the Coase Theorem demonstrates that the risk of a particular investment always is
reflected in its price. Id. at 97 & n.13. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
172. It does, however, permit unsophisticated capital providers to take respectable
gambles.
173. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE 456 (2d
ed. 1996) (noting the increased capacity of debt securities to yield high returns); John
Floegel, Equity Financing for Public Corporations: Reasons and Methods to Encourage It, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1411, 1419 (1990) (explaining that in 1990, equity financings represented "a
negligible percentage of total corporate financing"); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 613, 645 (1988) ("Firms rarely use equity issues to raise capital."); see also Australian
Q3 Current A/C Deficit 7.871 Bln Aud Vs 7.305 Bln Q2; Consensus 7.6, AFX EUROPEAN FOCUS,
Nov. 29, 2002 (describing 57 billion Australian dollars of equity, as compared to 347 billion
Australian dollars of debt); Canadian Oil Industry Financings Hit 10-Year High, OIL & GAS J.,
Mar. 10, 2003, at 38 (finding that the Canadian oil and natural gas industry's debt com-
prised 7.02 billion Canadian dollars of the 9.98 billion total oil financing in 2002). Moreo-
ver, even if nonspecific terms of repayment and return are highly desirable for at least
some corporations, there is no reason that classes of debt with these terms could not exist.
This highlights, of course, the fact (related to the team production point about "owner-
ship," described supra Part I.C) that "debt" and "equity" are just matters of definition and
borrows from corporate finance's willingness to hybridize the two. The question then
merely becomes what enforcement and monitoring rights would be required before credi-
tors would sign on to the deal. If they were to replicate the current perceived package of
shareholder entitlements, nothing would be gained by the redenomination.
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shareholders, what would the corporation's purpose be? Might all
publicly held corporations be managed primarily for the purpose of
creating goods and providing services, creating jobs and the like?
One thinks not. Actual adoption of such a model (further discussed
below) 174 would be roughly as likely as selection of an Asian female as
pope. In other words, modeling all corporations essentially along
nonprofit lines would be a complete political nonstarter-a flop, a
failure, dead in the water from the get-go. We regard ourselves as a
capitalist nation 1 75 and prize our putatively open markets. 176 Quite
arguably, the primary, and only truly indispensable, role of the share-
holder of a public corporation is to symbolize commitment to these
theoretical ideals.
IV. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Recapitulation of the Problems Presented by Shareholder Primacy
The problems presented by the doctrine of shareholder primacy
are numerous. Those intimated above include (1) the effect on share-
holders' security, ultimately reducing their sense of responsibility; (2)
the potential encouragement for directors to manhandle workers and
exploit consumers; (3) the possibility of adverse effects on innovation,
in part owing to the failure to address it; (4) encouragement of man-
agement to seek profits without limit; and (5) the obscuring of the
effect of corporate structuring on those outside existing power elites.
Although not previously raised in this Article , it also seems obvious
that shareholder primacy thinking contributes to irrational stock pric-
ing in both initial- and after-markets. 177
As indicated above, although shareholder primacy is not, at pre-
sent, the absolute mandate of statutory law, it is the object of admira-
tion of contractarians and, it seems, management itself.'7 8 The
practical pressures on management to observe shareholder primacy,
including psychological acculturation, competition for capital, and
avoidance of hostile takeover, 179 thus appear to have been sufficient
to outweigh any attempt to endow management (as embodied in the
174. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
175. For a basic description of capitalism, see ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, at
bk. 4 (Edwin Cannan ed., 2003).
176. Id.; see also Posner & Parisi, supra note 2, at xi.
177. See Euphoric Market Transactions, supra note 88, at 233-34 (discussing the various
reasons for stockholders' investment choices).
178. See generally supra Part I.A.
179. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text; infra notes 213-216 and accompany-
ing text.
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board of directors) with discretion to consider nonshareholder
constituents.
B. Solutions-Unscaled Eyes
Outsiders may be relatively more willing than the traditionally
privileged to color outside the lines, relying on their own experiences
in questioning and valuing traditional analyses and structures.
Frankly, some of the theoretical solutions that this process may reveal
would suffer the fate of the nonprofit model raised briefly above.'80
This recognition no doubt takes some of the fun out of the enterprise,
but does not discredit it. Fresh views and fringe analyses, although
not gaining anything like immediate acceptance, nonetheless may ex-
ercise some gravitational pull. Thus justified, the following comprises
a non-exhaustive sketching of theoretical solutions that might bear
further outsider consideration. The discussion proceeds in something
like an ascending order of perceived political plausibility.
1. The Abolition of Shareholders of Publicly Held Corporations.-This
is a proposal that would call for abolition of shareholding of public
corporations, per se, substituting all-debt capitalizations coupled with
government or contractual monitoring of managers. As no more than
an elaboration on the nonprofit model briefly advanced above,'' it
presents a glaring concern with plausibility.
A second substantial concern is whether such a model would risk
disincentive to innovation. Thus, some might fear that because man-
agers would not be charged with maximizing "residue" (there being
no one with a claim to it) they would have no particular reason to
finance such activities as research and development. There are at
least four responses to this concern. First, a great deal of the profit-
ability of public corporations results from profit extraction rather
than innovation,"' so the risk might not be as great as first meets the
eye. Second, some half of innovation takes place outside of public
corporations and would not, as an initial matter, be placed at risk.'8 3
Third, pride, curiosity, and the like could provide psychological moti-
vations for innovation notwithstanding the lack of a duty to sharehold-
180. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
182. See Bartow, supra note 155, at 674 (commenting on the uncertainty that corpora-
tions will profit from even the most diligent employee-investors as compared to profits
more predictably gleaned from an assembly line or service worker).
183. See id. at 673 (indicating that many inventions originate accidentally).
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ers. 184 Fourth, there very well could be methods of directly rewarding
innovation by permitting management bonuses or the like.18 5
The third obvious concern about the abolition model is that it
would invite management for the benefit of managers themselves.
This perceived detriment is somewhat easier to address than the first
and second. Providing shareholders with the right to elect the board
and to police management activity through derivative litigation may
be a method of at least symbolically diverting management from its
own interest (the necessity of which is discussed below),86 but there
certainly could be other effective methods of allocating and rewarding
the exercise of these rights without coupling them with the right to
residual profits. Contractarians doubtless would assert that such a sep-
aration would result in a theoretical reduction of efficiency,1 8 7 but to
progressives and outsiders that price might well be endurable.
2. The Granting of Residual Rights to Management.-A brief fling
also may be enjoyed with a model in which publicly held corporations
would be managed overtly for the benefit of management. Sharehold-
ers would receive only contractual entitlements, which might include
a profit share; any residue would be awarded to management. This
model would enable managers, after satisfying contractual entitle-
ments to shareholders and others, to disregard their own interests,
along the lines of sole ownership. In order to assure that skewing to-
ward management's short-term interests did not occur, and to provide
for orderly succession, some part of the profit earned could not be
withdrawn for an extended number of years and management would
be responsible for naming its successors.
There are two reasons for rejection of this model at this time.
First, of course, is its far-fetchedness. Second, feminists, critical race
theorists, and anyone who is even mildly skeptical of human nature
would fear that we would get, not a management group resembling
Henry Ford at his most benevolent, but something far more menac-
ing. Until the character of the managerial group is much more thor-
oughly examined and, perhaps, revised, proposals relying on
managerial incentive and/or good will are more than a bit dodgy.
184. See id. at 682 (discussing the manner in which patent laws aim to reward creativity
and individual innovation).
185. Contra id. at 682-83 (identifying the negative impact that corporation's marginaliza-
tion of employee-investors can have on innovation).
186. See infra text accompanying note 188.
187. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 91 (discussing the inevitable diver-
gence between the interests of those who contribute capital and the interests of
management).
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3. The Granting of Residual Rights to Employees.-In the third
model, shareholders would be granted contractual entitlements,
which might include profit-sharing. The residual "owners" of the en-
terprise would, however, be the employees. Explicit fiduciary duties
would run from managers to employees and employees would be
charged with selecting and monitoring managers. This model would,
among other things, permit focus on the integration of employee-
innovators into the corporate picture. This might work particularly
well where some of the innovation to be hoped for is good customer
service. The touted success of the employee ownership model of
Southwest Airlines might provide some valuable data in this regard. 8.
It is easy to understand why an employee ownership model would
have appeal to at least those outsiders historically better represented
as workers than as shareholders or managers. It also is easy to imagine
at least limited public acceptance for companies that would be so or-
ganized. Quite clearly, however, there will be no full-fledged revamp-
ing of existing corporations along these lines and no political
mandate that new companies adopt an employee-ownership form.
4. Investor Empowerment.-There exists an extensive literature
discussing the merits and demerits of various methods to empower
investors.' 8 9 The methods proposed include facilitating the commu-
nication of information among shareholders,1 90 enlarging the range
of matters that shareholders may vote upon and may require manage-
ment to include in its annual proxy statement,' 9 ' and developing a
"new breed" of professional directors elected to represent the inter-
188. See generally Paul Caver, Comment, Employee-Owned Airlines: The Cure for an Ailing
Industiy, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 639, 659-60 (1996) (describing the profitability of Southwest
Airlines).
189. See, e.g., Black, supra note 85, at 522-23 (emphasizing the importance of a formal
shareholder voting mechanism to provide managerial oversight); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond
Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117, 163-76 (1988) (analyzing
the potential consequences of "investor capitalism" operating as a check on "managerial-
ism"); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation,
1989 Wis. L. Rv. 881, 907-23 (suggesting empowering shareholders through the appoint-
ment of a committee of the corporation's largest stockholders and evaluating the benefits
and drawbacks of such an arrangement).
190. Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 83
(1991).
191. See id. at 78-81 (discussing changes to the one-share, one-vote standard).
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ests of institutional investors. ' 92 In some of these regards, progress
already has been made.' 93
Still, the image of shareholder passivity is so "deeply ingrained in
market ideology and current legal structures, " 194 one tends to suspect
that it would be impossible to eradicate it entirely. 19 5 Moreover, even
if generic shareholder empowerment somehow were achieved as a
theoretical matter, how could individual shareholders have the time,
the smarts, the hubris, and therefore the real incentive to get in-
volved? How could individual shareholders actually hope to perceive
and value all of their own interests as women, workers, etc.? These
questions may also be posed in terms of personal inclination and ex-
perience: how many of us, when returning from work at the end of
the day, would rather read proxy statements than watch television?
The fact of the matter is that when shareholders of a publicly
held corporation take an active interest in corporate business, it is
newsworthy and almost exclusively a phenomenon of involvement by
institutional investors.' 96 If we can neither expect nor realistically fa-
cilitate involvement by individual investors, it would appear that insti-
tutions must act as their proxies. In this event, some substantially
increased amount of attention should be devoted to the representa-
tive character of these institutions. 19
7
5. Creation of Safe Harbors (Including Constituency Statutes and the
Business Judgment Rule).-We have had decades of experience with
constituency statutes and the business judgment rule. Both of these
might fairly be characterized as safe harbors (unintended in the case
of the business judgment rule) for corporate directors who wish to
192. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda
for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 885-86 (1991) (describing the advantages of
this kind of director to institutional shareholders).
193. See, e.g., Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct.
23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249 & 274) (proposing methods of increas-
ing shareholder access to management's proxy for the purpose of nominating directors);
see also Joo, supra note 104, at 735-37 (discussing both progress and impediments to
progress).
194. Lemonade Stand, supra note 41, at 1431 (footnotes omitted).
195. Id at 1431 n.255 ("It must be recognized, for instance, that there always will be
individuals who are physically, mentally, or emotionally incapable of anything but
passivity.").
196. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States,
in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998) (discussing shareholder activism).
197. See generally John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three
Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2583, 2585-86 (1994) (describing methods of enhanc-
ing representative characteristics).
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take into account matters of human decency. 98 Neither could be
fairly characterized as any outstanding success in this regard, perhaps
because of the perception that market forces reward only the strong
and not the kind.1 99
Let us posit, then, something a bit less open-ended. This is the
creation of a safe harbor for management disregard of shareholder
interests in any context, provided that a minimum protection of con-
tractually defined profit and/or share price is achieved and provided
that the disregard in question does not implicate management's self-
interest.200 Although, as is the case with any safe harbor, there would
be no assurance that it would be employed, one can imagine three
possible prompts for usage.
The first two prompts can be easily described. The first is that the
safe harbor's relative specificity could contribute to some marginal
shift in cultural norms-a way for legislatures to signal that enough
shareholder moolah is enough.20 ' The second is that the safe harbor
could create substantial interest in groups that would lobby manage-
ment for a share of the pie. At least from the standpoint of labor,
such a safe harbor could create a substantial lever, for at a certain
level of profitability, management expressly would lose the ability to
invoke shareholder interest as a justification for rejecting worker
demands.20
2
The third prompt is more subtle. This is the possible effect on
share valuation of the existence of the proposal and the mere pros-
pect of its use. Thus, if it is known by the market that directors have
198. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 9394 (recognizing that the business
judgment rule shields managers from liability for negligent behavior). Note that the busi-
ness judgment rule as currently applied clearly would tolerate disregard of profit when
human decency so prompts. See id. That this possibility is misunderstood (or at any rate
ignored) by directors may be attributable to their perception of the likelihood of market
discipline. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text; infra notes 213-217 and accompa-
nying text.
199. As a matter of fact, it seems that things got worse. This probably was a question of
perceived marketplace pressure, rather than cause and effect. For discussion of market-
place pressure, see infra notes 213-217 and accompanying text.
200. This creation could be accomplished by statute. The change would likely be re-
garded as too extreme for mere judicial re-definition of the business judgment rule.
201. See Jayne Seminare Docherty, Culture and Negotiation: Symmetrical Anthropology for
Negotiators, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 711, 713-17 (2004) (examining methods of shifting cultural
norms).
202. See Team Production, supra note 21, at 253 (adopting a team production model
where the interests of players other than shareholders are considered, including the corpo-
ration's employees). It is possible that this lever would be so strong that amounts in excess
of the cut-off automatically would go to labor. Such an outcome would, however, presuma-
bly require a great deal of union activity, to which the proposal itself might actually
contribute.
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formal discretion to disregard profitability above a certain level, and
that interest groups will be lobbying for use of that discretion, might
not that knowledge creep back into the value of the shares them-
selves? 2°3 After all, only if the directors of a corporation credibly
could signal that the safe harbor would never (or seldom) be used
would it be rational for share prices to balloon past some reasonable
relationship with the profit "cap" (this, by itself, distinguishing this
safe harbor from the more open-ended general constituency statutes).
And if the valuation of the shares is, in effect, capped by the existence
of the safe harbor, might not directors go ahead and succumb to its
use? As suggested just above, their only alternative would seem to be
an attempt to signal non-usage. Signals by way of public announce-
ment would hardly result in very good publicity either for the corpora-
tion or for the directors as human beings; signals through historical
conduct would require a long-term resoluteness that would be diffi-
cult in these days of managerial turn-over.20 4
A second, perhaps supplementary, form of safe harbor might
confer immunity from liability for specific acts. For instance, it might
be stated that directors would never be liable for decisions reasonably
designed to augment worker or product safety, to assure legal compli-
ance, or to contribute to protection of the ozone. Almost without a
doubt, the most significant effect of this type of safe harbor would be
on directorial awareness (since the business judgment rule already
confers sufficient flexibility to accommodate the activities de-
scribed).2°5 This might or might not offset market pressures to disre-
gard the matters listed, but once again, one can imagine an effect on
interest group mobilization.
6. Requiring Conscience Committees.-We are, at this point in time,
becoming quite accustomed to the notion that a publicly held corpo-
ration should have a committee of independent directors charged
with overseeing the audit of the company's financials. 206 This locates
with specific individuals' responsibility for seeing that a process that
we hope will produce complete and correct financial statements is car-
203. See generally MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 173, at 259-80 (generally discussing valua-
tion and the "efficient capital market hypothesis").
204. See id. at 269-70 (discussing the "random walk model" of determining the price of
securities, namely, that stock prices change as a result of new information about the
security).
205. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 93-94; see also supra note 198 and accompa-
nying text.
206. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2002)).
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ried out.20 7 Reform of this type creates a context in which individuals
may act as well as an occasion for doing so; moreover, it signals a pub-
lic commitment that may have an acculturating effect on actual behav-
ior. Although it cannot assure its desired results, it should increase
the chances that they will occur.
One easily can imagine the creation of board corporate con-
science committees charged with considering such goals as fair treat-
ment of workers, good stewardship of the environment, and the
like.2"' Insofar as creation of such committees would institutionalize
process, create context and occasion, locate responsibility with indi-
viduals, and signal public commitment, it would seem that at least
some progress toward the specified goals would be made.
On the other hand, and as discussed above, we should be wary of
over (or perhaps any) reliance on board-centered proposals for
change.2 °9 Moreover, even if a conscience committee were to bring
about some sort of progress, could it possibly be enough? If not, is
not there a danger that the fanfare associated with adoption and im-
plementation of the proposals would consume all available energy
and attention, while something which might be more far-reaching and
ultimately successful were foregone? Finally, is not locating responsi-
bility for conscience issues with specific individuals a method of letting
other individuals off the hook?210 At least some of these risks might
be mitigated by supplementing the conscience committee proposal
with a code requiring some sort of conscience reports from line and
staff alike, but it is obvious that something along these lines would
need to be done.
7. Reinterpreting Market Forces.-One of the most useful contribu-
tions that outsiders could make toward alleviating the costs of share-
holder primacy might be to provide their perspectives on the usually
catalogued arguments about the market pressures allegedly forcing
managers to put profits first-to act as though there were, in fact, an
enforceable legal duty to maximize those profits for the benefit of
207. Id. § 101(c), 116 Stat. at 750-51. Of a piece, and consistent with the notion of
fiducial responsibilities on the part of individual agents, are requirements that particular
officers certify the corporation's financial statements. Id. § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 777.
208. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Story of Pinocchio: Now I'm a Real Boy, 45 B.C. L. REv.
829, 857-68 (2004) (discussing the conscience committee proposal in depth).
209. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 450-51 (2001) (analyzing the efficiency disadvantages of alternative models
as compared to the standard shareholder-based model).
210. See Feminism, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 46, at 19-20 (criticizing Justice
Cardozo's model of fiduciary duties for perpetuating problems of accountability and
responsibility).
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shareholders. These arguments include the need to keep product
prices low in order to meet competition, the need to compete for cap-
ital, the desire to avoid hostile takeover, and general psychological
acculturation. 1 a With respect to each of these arguments, outsiders'
perspectives will be colored by their own experiences. The few
thoughts set out below are intended to do no more than play a role in
soliciting additional accounts.
The need to keep prices low to be competitive tends, at face
value, to be pro-consumer and anti-worker. Thus understood, it does
not demand increased profitability and in fact could be consistent
with lower profitability up to the point of financial unviability. The
real point for directors, of course, is that if enough transactional vol-
ume is not maintained, shareholders will be disappointed and will sell
their shares. This is simply a manifestation, then, of the "competition
for capital" and "avoidance of takeover" arguments fleshed out imme-
diately below. It is worth noting, however, that to the extent workers
could share in the benefits of lowered prices, the trade-off might be a
less painful one. The experience of Southwest Airlines, which has suc-
ceeded where others have failed by keeping prices low while simulta-
neously protecting the interests of its worker/owners, once again is
noteworthy. 21 2
The argument that competition for capital plays a critical role in
managerial profit-seeking is easily understandable, albeit a bit over-
blown. Not everyone has experience with accumulation for its own
sake; there are many who have been forced to realize that it is possible
to get by on less than what someone else has. In other words, why
does a corporation need more capital than it actually needs? Why
must it endlessly grow? 213 Given, too, the availability of debt financ-
ing, is it not true that a large part of managerial preoccupation with
stock price is a concern with the fortunes of those who choose to en-
gage in stock market speculation? This concern seems, rather than to
stand on its own two feet, to segue seamlessly into the "takeover avoid-
ance" argument.
Thus, the flip side of the competition for capital argument is the
hostile takeover argument. Management fears that shareholders will
vote with their feet for new management. Such fears could be as-
suaged with long-term management "contracts," but those could pose
211. See Gevurtz, supra note 32, at 651-53 (discussing factors influencing the shareholder
primacy model); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
213. See generally Kellye Y. Testy, Adding Value(s) to Corporate Law: An Agenda for Reform,
34 GA. L. REv. 1025, 1034-36 (2000).
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their own hazards, at least from the standpoint of outsiders. Interest-
ingly, contractarians value hostile takeovers as a form of market disci-
pline, urging the view that managerial efficiency will be enhanced if it
is realized that undervalued and/or underperforming firms are sub-
ject to acquisition.214 The argument is a theoretically and emotionally
coherent one. After all, most of us can understand reasoning to the
effect that "if I do well and please the owner of the business, he won't
fire me." It is, however, noteworthy that there is no proof that it is in
fact underperforming firms that are acquired; there actually is modest
evidence to the contrary.215 It seems somewhat perverse to continue
to rely on an empirically unproven theory to justify the result of share-
holder primacy, at least if that result is viewed by some as being quite
costly.
The fourth argument explaining shareholder primacy has to do
with psychological pressure. One hardly can contest the notion that
managers are influenced by culture, press accounts, etc., and thus may
believe such things as that "big" is better for "big's" own sake and that
it is, in fact, management's job to increase stock price.216 That said,
hand-wringing is not often endorsed as the solution to mass delusion,
nor should it be here.
8. Treating Symptoms.-At this point, it seems quite logical to ad-
mit that we do not know how to cure the patient and nonetheless
attempt to address a few of the patient's most troubling symptoms.
For instance, we may be concerned that shareholder primacy thinking
contributes to irrational secondary market pricing, 217 as well as that
irrational secondary market pricing feeds back into shareholder pri-
macy thinking. The argument here is that if potential shareholders
believe that corporations will be ruthlessly operated so as to maximize
profit at every turn, they will perceive no rational cap on stock price
and/or believe that others will perceive no such cap, and sometimes
will bid wildly. Conversely, if stock prices generally inflate, managers
will believe that they must signal utmost concern for increasing the
214. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1169-74 (1981) (arguing that
the tender bidding process serves as a check on managers' behavior, whether or not the
process results in an offer); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for
Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1, 9 (1978) (em-
phasizing the incentive value created by the possibility of tender offers).
215. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
216. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 209, at 449-51 (commenting on the logical,
exemplary, and competitive success of shareholder primacy as a form of corporate
governance).
217. See generally MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 173, at 259-80 (discussing valuation).
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market value of the shares of their particular corporations. If these
indeed are concerns, perhaps we should address irrational stock pric-
ing directly. Would it be that hard, after all, to adopt some sort of
reverse circuit-breaker rule, calling for a market cooling-off period
when a stock price ceases to bear any reasonable relationship to the
issuing corporation's anticipated earnings?21 For that matter, would
it be too difficult to provide that transactions involving such prices
simply could not be executed by any national exchange or automated
trading system? 211
Of a piece, if we are troubled by the notion that, in the name of
shareholder primacy, public corporations sometimes extract unjustifi-
able profit by exploiting vulnerable groups, let us meet the problem
head on. If we are concerned about childish purchasers convinced to
pay eye-popping prices for celebrity-endorsed apparel,22 ° or led to be-
lieve that they cannot live without the guts-and-glory video games that
habituate them to violence, 221 let us talk about counter-publicity and
rating systems with long, sharp teeth.
CONCLUSION
Because feminist analysis and critical race theory are firmly
grounded in non-utopian experience, they necessarily eschew utopian
visions. They neither would nor could, at this point in time, properly
dictate a complete theoretical retooling of corporate law or corporate
America. Still, at least some of the adherents of feminist and critical
race theory presumably could endorse, and willingly advance, con-
crete proposals for incremental progress. 222 From this standpoint,
recommendations smelling even slightly of, say, worker empowerment
or protection of childish consumers might be warmly welcomed. Out-
siders may, however, have an even more immediate contribution to
make to corporate law. This contribution is the addition of new per-
218. See Euphoric Market Transactions, supra note 88, at 278 (proposing a stop on secon-
dary market purchases one hundred times the potential earnings of the stock).
219. See id. at 279 (arguing that day traders should be required to complete a course or
possess minimum credentials before trading).
220. See generally Crouch, supra note 142, at 179-80 (discussing concern for the detrimen-
tal effects of advertising on children).
221. See generally Bonnie B. Phillips, Note, Virtual Violence or Virtual Apprenticeship: Justifi-
cation for the Recognition of a Violent Video Game Exception to the Scope of First Amendment Rights
of Minors, 36 IND. L. REv. 1385, 1385-86 (2003) (commenting on the effect of video games
on violence rates among children).
222. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist
Legal Thought, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 303, 303-08 (generally addressing the progress of feminism
and the law and emphasizing the role of tradition in advancing feminist ideals).
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spectives, different values, and previously unheard experiential ac-
counts to the corporate analytic brew.
From the time man began to tell stories, God-myths gave order to
human existence. 223 They gave us reasons for being, as well as for
doing things beyond the instinctive. Some of these things doubtless
were instrumental to human survival, such as the observance of taboos
against eating unsafe foods. 2 24 Many of our divinely attributed man-
dates were articulated and eventually subsumed as cultural mores.
Thus, at one time, we did not steal because God said not to. We
learned to believe, then, that stealing is bad and still generally live
according to that dictate. This rule, and many others, continues to
operate beyond the express invocation of the God-myth. 225
Owner-myths have given order to large-scale human enter-
prise. 226 Observations made in the context of small businesses (aug-
mented, no doubt, by near-religious American beliefs in private
property) 227 evidently have programmed us to believe that someone
must "own" the public corporation in order to bring about innovation
and social progress. Like God-myths, owner-myths have been suffi-
ciently subsumed in American culture to operate without express in-
vocation and therefore without proper scrutiny. Might not it be
possible to revisit this matter? And might not those who have not, in
the past, played a role in the telling of official stories be the ones to
shoulder the task?
223. See generally EDrrH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 14-23 (1942) (describing the effect of
myths).
224. Id. at 49-54.
225. See Robert L. Palmer, When Law Fails: Ethics, Commerce, and Tales of Value, 2 S. CAL.
INTERDISc. L.J. 245, 267-71 (1993) (discussing operation of myths and stories).
226. See supra Part III.D.
227. See Majorie E. Kornhauser, A Taxing Woman: The Relationship of Feminist Scholarship to
Tax, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 301, 315 n.42 (1997) (emphasizing that feminist
theory is not unconcerned with private property).
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